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Thu Apr 3 07:59:10 2008Resolution of conjectures on the sustainability 
of natural monopoly 
Thijs ten Raa* 
Sharkey has conjectured that,for  a natural monopoly: (I)  the core price vector of some output 
vector (which renders any partial  supply of the output  unprojitable) lies on the demand 
curve; and (2) such a price  vector is sustainable, meaning that supply by an entrant would 
be unprojitable, even at lower prices.  This article demonstrates that (I) is true even under 
quite general conditions that allow Jor  interdependent demand  (2) is true provided  that 
demand is independent, but (2) can be invalidated by demand interdependence. 
1.  Introduction 
Contestability theory features the following concepts: lack of cross subsidization, sup- 
portability and core prices, anonymous equity, and sustainability. Some discussion about 
which concept should be favored is still continuing among authors such as Gerald Faulhaber, 
William Sharkey, Robert Willig, and William Baumol. Essentially the definitions are more 
demanding as one moves from lack of cross subsidization to sustainability. Baumol's sus- 
tainability concept is most  stringent, while Faulhaber7s subsidy freeness is the weakest 
requirement. Our brief treatment of the literature follows this conceptual line and is, as a 
result, nonhistorical. 
Faulhaber (1975) and parts of Faulhaber  and Levinson (1981) merely require that 
prices be subsidy-free. This means that no group of customers pays more than its stand- 
alone costs. Costs should be allocated "evenly,"  for otherwise some group of customers 
would constitute an eager target for a potential entrant in the industry, violating an industrial 
equilibrium notion. 
Supportability or core prices are a slightly stricter device of cost allocation without 
subsidies, for now  the  revenues of  no part  of  total output, whether or not  the part  is 
consumed by a particular group of customers, should exceed its stand-alone costs. Sharkey 
and Telser (1 978) require this to circumvent data collection regarding the individual con- 
sumer demands that aggregate to total demand. Sharkey and Telser impose the additional 
requirement as they extend Faulhaber7s  (1 975) application of the core from the setting of 
discrete n-person games to continuous games in which all outputs can be  produced in 
continuously varying amounts. 
Willig (1  979) and Faulhaber and Levinson (1 98 1) go further. The concept of anonymous 
equity, which they use,  not only excludes revenues that exceed the stand-alone costs of 
some part of output and that thereby offer scope for entry at the prevailing prices, but also 
requires that the price vector correspond with total output through the market demand 
function.  Only with the concept of anonymous equity is the demand side introduced. In 
fact, anonymous equity is "market-clearing7' supportability. 
Baumol, Bailey, and Willig's (1977) notion of sustainability is almost the same, but 
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requires in addition that entry at lower prices (with possibly greater quantities) than the 
prevailing ones be rendered unprofitable. Sustainability is the most complete concept of 
industrial equilibrium. 
The transition from a less restrictive concept to a more stringent one is a matter of 
adding conditions on cost and demand  functions or of determining classes of  cost and 
demand functions under which both sets of requirements are met. The transition  from 
subsidy-freeness to supportability has been studied by Faulhaber and Levinson (1  98 1). The 
transitions from supportability to anonymous equity and further to sustainability are more 
difficult. Sharkey (1981), however, has conjectured that for a natural monopoly: (1) the 
core price vector of some output vector lies on the demand curve; and (2) such a price 
vector is sustainable. Conjecture (1) amounts, essentially, to a transition from the concept 
of supportability and core prices to the concept of anonymous equity, and Conjecture (2) 
to the final transition. 
This article resolves Sharkey's conjectures and thus helps to clarify the interrelations 
among the various concepts in contestability theory. As is true of the literature referred to 
above, the present piece is confined to a natural monopoly analysis. For general industry 
structures, ten Raa (1981) may serve as a starting point. 
2.  The model and the conjectures 
We  begin  where  Sharkey (1981) ends. Sharkey concludes with  some thoughts  on the 
existence of sustainable prices for general cost functions. Prices are sustainable if: (i) they 
cover the production costs of the quantities called forth by demand, but (ii) supply at lower 
prices by  a potential entrant would yield  a loss. Thus, sustainability is an equilibrium 
concept for markets with competitive entry. 
Formally, Sharkey  lets  Q(p) E R:  be  the quantities  demanded  at a price  vector 
p E  R:  and C(q) E  R+be the costs of a quantity vector q E R:, and then defines sustainable 
prices pm  by the conditions: 
(0 pmQ(pm)  2 CIQ(pm)I and 
(ii)  [pe Ipm,  qe I  Q(pe), where qf > 0 only if pP  <  py] =, peqe< C(qe). 
To formulate his thoughts Sharkey also employs the concept of core prices P(q), which 
can be defined for a quantity vector q by the conditions P(q)q r  C(q) and q' I q =+  P(q)qe 
I C(qe). (This definition is slightly stricter than  Sharkey's. Using the stricter definition 
creates no problem, for the concern is to find suficient conditions for sustainable pricing.) 
Sharkey's (  198 1, p.  1  54) conjectures are: 
(I) There exists a price vector p0 which is contained in P[Q(~')]; 
(2) Such a price vector is sustainable. 
Conjecture (1) lends itself to a proof using a theorem in ten Raa (1981). A price vector 
that satisfies (1) is anonymously equitable in the terms of Faulhaber and Levinson (198 1, 
p. 1085). 
Of course, Sharkey's conjectures are based on certain assumptions about the demand 
and cost functions: 
Assumption I. Q is independent: 
Assumption 2. Q is bounded for marginal cost prices and continuous for higher prices. 
Assumption 3. C satisfies cost complementarity: 
for all outputs x, y, and z r  0. TEN RAA  /  137 
Assumption 4. Every subset of outputs can be supplied at a profit: 
for all nonzero q there is a t(q) E R+ such that pt(q)q 2 C[t(q)q] for some p E Q-'[t(q)q]. 
To circumvent uninteresting complications: t(q) have been selected such that t is continuous. 
(Sharkey, 1981, respectively pp.  146, 146, 153, and 151 line 4, i.e.,  (19) or, equivalently, 
(13).) 
Assumption 4 coincides with Sharkey's when the fixed costs are separable. Otherwise 
Assumption 4 is stricter. Sharkey merely requires that consumers are willing to pay variable 
costs plus incremental  fixed costs, whereas Assumption 4 requires them to pay variable 
costs plus the fixed  costs themselves.  As  is well  known,  the incremental  fixed costs of 
natural  monopoly outputs fall short of the fixed costs of those outputs (Sharkey, 1981, 
p.  146). Our stronger assumption is needed to search in all directions in output space for 
core prices that match inverse demand. Otherwise, we cannot apply our fixed point argument 
in the process. 
Proposition 1 will prove Conjecture (I). In fact, this will be done under generalization 
in which Assumption  1 is replaced by: 
Assumption 5. The demand for any good does not decline if the prices of some other goods 
rise: 
p 2 p',  pi = p: =+ Qi(p) 2 Qi(pf)  (weak gross substitutability). 
Assumption 6. Whenever one set of prices is replaced by another, there is at least one good 
whose demand moves in the opposite direction from its price: 
p # p' =+  for some i: (p -pf);[Q(p) - Q(pf)],< 0  (normality) (Sandberg, 1975). 
Also, Proposition 2 will  prove that Conjecture (2) is true for some price vector p0 
provided that we return to Sharkey's strong Assumption  1. And surprisingly, Proposition 
3 will show that under Assumptions 5 and 6, no prices p0 (and therefore no prices at all) 
need be sustainable. 
3.  Resolution of the conjectures 
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 resolve Sharkey's conjectures. 
Proposition 1.Given Assumptions 5, 6, 2, 3, and 4, Conjecture (I) is true. 
Remark. Assumptions  5,  6, 2,  3, and 4  are proved to guarantee  what  Faulhaber  and 
Levinson (1981) call anonymous equity. This result extends their Proposition  10, which 
hinges on Assumption  1. 
ProoJ:  Basically,  we  subject Q and P to Lemma  3  of ten  Raa (1981, p.  15), which  is 
reproduced in the Appendix. 
For  compactness,  however,  we  also  use  an  intermediate  mapping.  Formally,  let 
Fo(p) = Q(p), Fi(q) = max{max[l, t(q)]q, t} and F2(q) = P(q). Here t is a positive vector 
and the first maximum is defined component by  component. 
F', raises output vectors away from the origin-where  core prices go to infinity in 
the presence of fixed costs-towards  the zero-profit locus of  Assumption  4. Moreover, 
since this complication may hold for components near the axes, all quantities are set at 
least at t. 
We want Fito belong to the class of upper semicontinuous convex-valued correspon-
dences. Of Fo this is true by  Assumption  2,  at least for prices above marginal cost. Of 
Fi this is true by  Assumption 4. As noted by Sharkey (1981, p.  154), under Assumption 
3 the core P(q) is known to exist. (For a proof in the differentiable case, see Panzar and 
Willig (1977, p.  21)). Thus, F2is a correspondence. It is convex-valued by  definition of 138  /  THE RAND JOURNAL, OF ECONOMICS 
P(q). It can be seen to be upper semicontinuous since cost function C is continuous from 
below, a fact that follows from Assumption 3 on this cost function. In sum, the F, are as 
desired. 
Next we  specify the Sito be convex compacta. Choosing qe = t in the definition of 
P(q), we see that F2({q r  t}) is bounded and hence contained in some convex compactum 
S6.  By  Panzar and Willig (1977, Proof of Condition 6), Sh  can be situated in the set of 
above marginal cost prices, M. For such a p, pi > c;, the marginal cost, and by Assumption 
6 (letting (i) represent all indices but i), Qi(p) < Qi(ci,  Q(~,),  which is bounded by Assumption 
2. Thus Q(M) is bounded and, therefore, contained in some convex compactum SI.Finally, 
let S2be {q(  min t(s) < lqll < max[lSlll, max t(s)]}. S2contains all SI-vectors after they 
Isl1=~  Is11= 1 
possibly have been  raised  towards the zero-profit locus (under mapping Fi), as will  be 
shown now. An  image point of Fi satisfies q 2 t(q)q = t(qllql1 )qllql I  or Iq11 2 t(qllql I ) 
2 min  t(s). The second part  of the upper bound  constraint,  lql, I  max t(s), has been 
Is1  1 =1  Isl1= 1 
introduced in the definition of S2to contain the vectors that have been  raised  from SI 
through Fi. 
Then Fo:S6  --* SI,  and, for t small, F;: SI-S2fl  {q 2 E}  and 
By  Lemma  3  and the  Remark  of  the  Appendix, their  composition has  a  fixed  point 
P'  E F2(Fi(Fo(pt)>)= P(qf),  where q' = Fi(Q(pf)) = max{max[l, t(Q(pf))lQ(~'),  t} E S2. 
Letting t 10, there is an accumulation point q0 E S2.  But pY  P(qf),  hence p'q'  = C(qf) 
IC(q) for some q 2 qt, E  small. Consequently, if  qy  > 0, then p; has an accumulation 
point p?. Otherwise, let py  denote an accumulation point if it exists or else infinity. Thus, 
for some index set I,py  is finite, while p:I,  is infinite. Note that since q0 E S2and the latter 
does not contain the origin in view  of Assumption 4, I is nonempty  or p0 #  co.Now 
pi E PI(q;), and by  the noted upper semicontinuity of P, py  E PI(qy). By  definition of 
core prices, p$, E P(I,(qfT,).  It follows that p0 E p(qO)  with q0 = max[l, t(Q(pO))]Q(pO).  If 
Q(pO)= 0, we  are done. Otherwise, QJ(pO)  is strictly positive for some nonempty index set 
J, and we  must show that t(Q(pO)) I I. Suppose not: t(Q(pO))  > I. By  definition oft  in 
Assumption 4, pt(Q(pO))Q(pO)  2 C[t(Q(p0))Q(p0)1  for some P E Q-'[t(Q( pO))Q(pO)l.  BY 
Assumptions 5 and 6 and Sandberg (1975, Lemma 2), p I p0 with strict inequality for the 
components J by  Sandberg (1980). It follows that 
This contradicts the established fact that p0 E p(qO).  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2. Given Assumptions 1-4,  Conjecture (2) is true for some price vector. 
Proof(for  dimension 2). (The higher dimension case proceeds along the line of Sharkey 
(1  98 1, p.  15 I).) By  Proposition  1 there are price vectors p0 contained in p[Q(pO)].  Select 
a p0 such that no other p 5p0 has this fixed point property. Then, in fact, pQ(p) < C[Q(p)] 
as will  be  shown  first.  For  suppose to the contrary that pQ(p) 2 C[Q(p)].  By  further 
reduction of the pi < pQ  and Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 we  may assume pQ(p) = C[Q(p)]. 
To establish a contradiction we  wish  to show that p  has the fixed  point  property, i.e., 
4'  5 Q(P) =+  pqe  C(qe). 
It suffices to consider the corner values qr = 0 and qr = Q,(p) because C is concave 
in qi by Assumption 3. Define S = {ilp, <  py  } and T = {ilqr = Q,(p)). If  T fl  S= 4, then 
aqe = PT~% = PTQT(P)= p%QT(~')I C[QT(P')I  = C[QT(P)] = C(q%)= C(qe), defining 
pr as the vector with p's  T-components and zeros elsewhere, and employing Assumption 
1 and the core property of pO.  Otherwise, by  Assumption 3 and the same core property, 
C(q')  = ~[QT(P)] 2 C[QT(PO)]+ C[Q(P)I - CIQ(pO)I 2 POQT(PO) + PQ(P) - pOQ(pO) TEN RAA  /  139 
= pOQr(pO) + PQS(P) - pOQs(pO)= PQS(P) + P~Q~-~(P~) - POQ~-~(PO)= PQSUAP) 
-P~Q~-~(PO) 2 pQT(p)=pqeif and only if, addingpQsPr(p) to both sides of the inequality, 
pQs-j-(p)  2  Thus, if T 3 S, then pqe 5 C(qe). It follows that if S = {i),  then 
T nS = 4 or T 3 S, and hence pqe < C(qe),the contradiction. Consequently, if S = {i), 
then pap)  < C[Q(p)]. Otherwise, S = (1, 2) and pQ(p) 2  C[Q(p)] would contradict the 
just-established result in view of Assumption 4 and the intermediate value theorem. This 
completes the demonstration that pQ(p) < C[Q(p)] for any other p IpO. 
Next we  shall show that p0 is sustainable. Suppose to the contrary that there are pe I pO 
and q I a#) (4, > 0 only if pr <pp) with peg 2 C(4). Then  max 
4 5 ape);  p:  =pp=3qi=~ pe4 - C(4) > 0. 
The  maximizer,  say  q4  is  a  corner  solution  in  every  coordinate,  for  the  objec-
tive  function  is  convex  in  q,  as  C  is  concave  in  q,  by  Assumption  3.  Define 
U = {ilqf = Q,(pe)).Then qe = Qu(pe). Since costs may be assumed positive (otherwise 
qe = 0 would always violate the definition of sustainability), maximizer qe cannot be all 
zero. Consequently qr = Q,(pe) > 0 for some i, and, by the constraint on qe,p:'  < pp.  To 
establish a contradiction with the result of the first part of the proof, we  wish  to derive 
peQ(pe)2 C[Q(pe)] from the facts p'  5 pOand peQu(p') 2 C[QU(pe)].By  Assumption 1 
we  may assume pi;)  = pe - pl;  = pl)r/). Then by  Assumption  1,  the core property of pO, 
and Assumption 3, we  have 
Proposition 3. Given Assumptions 5, 6, 2, 3, and 4, Conjecture(2) is false; in fact, sustainable 
prices need not exist. 
Proof  (for dimension 2). Let Q(p) = @~~/*p:/*, pt12p;312)and C(q) = c(ql) + c(q2)with 
c(0) = l/4,  ~(1) = 1, ~(2) = 2'13 + 2-'13/4 - l/4  and piecewise linear elsewhere. Then the 
assumptions are fulfilled. 
Q is invertible, in fact Q-'(4) = (q;314q;114,q;114q5314). Consequently,pQ(p) = C[Q(p)] 
if and only if q t14q;114+ q-'14q114 2 1  = ~(ql) + ~(42). This defines the only q for which Q1(q) 
are possibly core prices, i.e., Conjecture (1) candidates. 
By  symmetry  considerations  we  may  further  limit  to  ql 2  42,  or,  equivalently, 
q, 2 1. The possibility that q, > 1 is ruled out by  taking qe = (q,, 0) in the core price 
conditions. Thus, q, = 1 with the result that q2 = 1 is the only output vector for which 
QP'(q) (=(I, 1)) are core prices. This Conjecture (I)  condition, however, is necessary for 
sustainability, as can be  seen  by  letting pe T  pm in the definition of  sustainability and 
observing the continuity part of Assumption 3. 
It  remains  to  be  shown  that  the  Conjecture  (1)  price  vector  (1,  1)  is  not  sus-
tainable.  For  that  purpose  consider pe = (2-*I3,  1)  and qe = (2,  0) I Q(pe). Then 
peqe = 2Il3 > 2Il3 + 2--'13/4- l/4  = C(qe) for 1 >  Q.E.D. 
Remark. It is interesting to investigate how unsustainable an industry is. For a discussion 
and an analysis, see ten Raa (198 1). 
4.  Discussion 
It has been held as an article of faith that conditions not only under which core price 
vectors exist but also under which one set of them coincides with the market price vector 
would be sufficient for sustainability. Thus, in providing an example of an unsustainable 
natural monopoly, Panzar and Willig (1977, p.  10) turn to a case in which  the market 
prices are not in the core. Moreover, Sharkey (1981, p. 154)writes that if some price vector 
were in the core, then it would be sustainable (Conjecture (2)). I, too, believed that, to put 140  /  THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
it equivalently, market-clearing core prices would be sustainable. But this article illustrates 
that it need not be true. 
Assume that the cost function satisfies cost complementarity (Assumption 3).  Then 
core prices exist as in Panzar and Willig (1977, p. 21). In addition, given Assumptions 5, 
6, and 4, some market price vector is  in the core by  Proposition  1. (This is unlike the 
Panzar-Willig example, which violates Assumption 4.) Yet this price vector is unsustainable 
by Proposition 3. Thus, sustainability is a more subtle matter than simultaneity of the core 
property and market clearance. This observation is, of course, consistent with the definitions 
of the concepts, which are progressively tighter, as mentioned in the Introduction. 
The counterexample given in the proof of Proposition 3 describes a natural monopoly 
that can set prices such that not only is demand fulfilled at zero profit, but also any partial 
supply will  be out-of-pocket. An  entrant may, however, cut the price of one good and 
increase demand dramatically. Economies of scale render exclusive supply of that good 
profitable. In other words, in the example in Proposition 3, no monopolist who supplies 
the whole market, even without cross subsidies, can prevent large-scale specialized entry. 
Appendix 
W  Proposition  1 was proved by  using a fixed point argument of ten Raa (1981,pp.  11-17). Since this source 
is an unpublished thesis, the pertinent  mathematics is reproduced here. 
A correspondence F: S -SImaps points of S to nonempty subsets of S,  . For S and S, metric, F is upper 
semicontinuous if x" -x, y" EF(x"),  yn -y implies y E F(x)and upper hemicontinuous if x" -x, y" E F(x") 
implies y"' -y, y E F(x)for some subsequence. Finally, F has afixed point if x E F(x)for some x. 
Lemma 3. Let S be a convex compactum in a Euclidean space and S,,  . .. ,  S,,, metric spaces. If Fo: S - S,, 
F,: S, -S2,  . . . ,F,,,:  S,,, -S are upper hemicontinuous convex-valued correspondences, then F, .. . . .F,,,has 
a fixed point. 
Remark. A sufficient condition for upper hemicontinuity  is upper semicontinuity with compact range (S,). 
Proof  of  Lemma 3 (ten Raa, 1981, pp.  16-17). For m = 0 the lemma becomes Kakutani's fixed point theorem, 
since F,: S - S, S compact, is upper hemicontinuous if  and only if  it is upper  semicontinuous.  Suppose the 
lemma is valid for m  1. Then we  shall prove it for m by  the technique of Kakutani (1941).In particular, we  -
may assume that S is an r-dimensional closed simplex. 
Let S'")be the nth barycentric simplicia1 subdivision of S. For each vertex x" of S'")take an arbitrary point 
y" from F,(xn).Then the mapping xnb  yn thus defined on all vertices of S'")will define, when extended linearly 
inside each simplex of S'"),a continuous point-to-point  mappingf,: S -S,.  Consequently, by  the upper hemi- 
continuity of F,,1;,.F, is upper hemicontinuous. Since F, is convex-valued, so isf, .F,.  Consequently, by  the 
induction hypothesis, (f, F,)  .F2  . ..  F,,,has a fixed point, say x,,. 
Let A,  be an r-dimensional simplex of S'")which contains the point x,,. Let xt,  x;, . . . ,x: be the vertices 
of  A,.  Then  we  have x,, =  Z:=,h:x:  for  suitable  h:  > 0  with  Z:=,X:' =  1.  Let  us  further put  y:  = f,(x:) 
(i = 0, I, .. . , r). Then we  have y:  E Fo(x:)and x, E  (F,  F2  .. . a F,,,)[f,(x,,)] = (FI  . . .  F,,,)(ZLJ:y:). 
Since lim  x,,  = xu implies lim  xyk = x,  for i  = 0,  1,  . . ., r,  and Fo is upper hemicontinuous,  there exists a 
k-m  k-m 
subsequence {nk}k=I,2,..  m, S 3 x,, -xo, Fo(xYk)  A?. such that, for k - 3 y:k -yp  E F,(xo)and [O,  I] 3  XYk -
Clearly,  XP  2 0,  =  1  and, by  the upper  hemicontinuity  of  F,, . . . , F,,  and therefore F, ... . .F,,,, 
xo E (F, .. . . .F,)(Z:=,XP~P). yp  E F,(xo)implies, by  the convexity of F,(xo),  Z:=,XPyP E Fo(x0).Consequently, 
xo E (FI  . ..  F,)[Fo(xo)] = (Fo a FI  . . .  F,)(x~). Q.E.D. a  a 
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